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Abstract
This paper has three basic objectives. First, it summarizes the general theories of rational-
ity that are currently available in the social sciences. Secondly, it describes the specificity 
of Boudon’s approach to rationality in contrast to the previous ones. Finally, it suggests a 
few ways in which this approach can be enhanced and complemented in order to achieve 
a solid theory on the interpretation of human actions in a social world. 
Keywords: Boudon; axiological rationality; cognitive rationality; ordinary rationality; 
explanation.
Resumen.¿Existen muchos tipos de racionalidad?
Este artículo tiene tres objetivos principales. En primer lugar, se ofrece una panorámica 
de las teorías de la racionalidad actualmente disponibles en ciencias sociales. En segundo 
lugar, se discute la especificidad de la aproximación de Boudon en contraste con las ante-
riores. Finalmente, se sugieren algunas vías a través de las cuales la aproximación puede ser 
mejorada y completada con la finalidad de alcanzar una teoría sólida de la interpretación 
de las acciones humanas en el mundo social.
Palabras clave: Boudon; racionalidad axiológica; racionalidad cognitiva; racionalidad ordi-
naria; explicación.
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1. Introduction
Raymond Boudon’s contribution to social theory has two main dimensions. 
First, he has been a pioneer in the theorization of mechanisms that govern 
social reality and allow social explanations (Boudon, 1974). Second, he has 
been responsible for a broadening of the notion of rationality, beyond the 
one involved in the standard rational choice model (Boudon, 2007, 2009). 
The link between the two aspects is that mechanisms in social life necessarily 
involve individual actions, and that these actions can be to a certain extent 
interpreted in terms of rationality. This implies a reflection on the notion of 
rationality itself, and its characterization. It is part of the indispensable more 
general reflection on the process of understanding action in a social context. 
This is a central issue for social sciences: collecting or simulating data is only 
the first step; the second step is to explain social phenomena, and this always 
requires procedures for understanding behaviour. 
Boudon’s contribution to the theory of rationality has itself two main 
dimensions (Boudon, 2011): on one side, he has insisted that rationality 
should not be understood only as instrumental or utilitarian, but should 
also involve what he has named “cognitive” and “axiological” dimensions. 
The idea is that the standard rational choice model does not satisfactorily 
take into account these two essential aspects of action that are necessary to 
its interpretation. Therefore, the grammar of the interpretive work in social 
sciences requires the introduction of cognitive and axiological features I 
will describe further on in this paper. Second, although rationality has vari-
ous dimensions (mainly, in his words, instrumental, utilitarian, cognitive 
and axiological), it is unified as a general structure of human behaviour 
and named as such as “ordinary rationality”. He has described his theory 
of rationality as referring to this “ordinary rationality” beyond the various 
dimensions he had emphasized. This poses the problem of the link between 
the general idea of rationality and its various dimensions. What is the com-
mon element of rationality that allows us to speak of rationality when we 
introduce several types of rationality? 
In this paper, I will try to:
1) Summarize the general theories of rationality that are currently available in 
the social sciences. 
2) Describe the specificity of Boudon’s approach to rationality in contrast to 
the previous ones. 
3) Suggest a few ways by which this approach can be enhanced and completed 
in order to achieve a sound theory of the interpretation of human actions 
in a social world. 
I will concentrate on a general approach to the idea of rationality which is 
rarely followed, oriented by the question of the justification of the very idea 
of rationality: when are we entitled to speak of rationality and why should we 
consider an action as a rational one? What is, at a meta level, the justification 
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of such an idea? In particular does it involve a normative dimension and, if this 
is the case, how is it articulated to the positive investigation of social science? 
2. Various theories of rationality 
There are five basic widespread notions of rationality in the social sciences 
(including Boudon’s approach). They are classically linked to methodological 
individualism, since theories of rationality are theories of rational actions. All 
of them can be related, more or less clearly, to Popper’s “problem-solving” 
notion (Popper, 1967). 
The first one is to consider that individuals are rational whenever they act 
in an intentional way. The intentional decision to act corresponds to the reason 
someone has to act, for instance smoking for her pleasure, or not smoking in 
order to avoid health problems. This classical idea can be found in Weber. 
An irrational behaviour would be then to act on the basis of non-inten-
tional causes. For instance, Kahneman (2011) reports a study about parole 
judges observed in their decisions. In this example, individual judges tend to 
be more severe when they are hungrier: clearly in this case non-intentional 
and unconscious causes affect intentional decisions. The judges are not aware 
of the influence of those factors on their deliberate decisions. This means that 
intentional motives do not have the sole influence on individual decisions; 
however, in this example it is still intentional decisions that are at stake, partly 
determined by unconscious trends. It can be also the case that people will act 
in a manner that is opposed to their intentions, for instance when they smoke 
although they would prefer not to smoke. 
Intentional action can clearly be linked to and dependent on psychological 
features or social norms. When we speak of reasons to act, these reasons can 
obviously include the acceptance of given social or cultural norms. Therefore, 
in this first meaning of intentionality, rationality does not give clear criteria 
for decisions that would lead towards specific kinds of choices, which would, 
for instance, be different from and maybe opposed to the acceptance of social 
norms. But it stresses the fact that in order to be rational, an intention of 
action must be the effective source of action: I decide to act according to my 
intention to act, whereas, when I am not rational, I act on the basis of causes 
that do not correspond to my intentions, either because they are opposed to 
my intentions, or because they overcome my intentions, or because I have no 
intentions at all. This has a problem-solving dimension since I must decide 
how to act given my situation (Shall I Smoke? Shall I not smoke given all the 
consequences I know about smoke?). Ideally, an individual decision is the 
“correct” decision one should take, according to one’s situation, although the 
criteria of such correctness are not one-sided and do not lead to interpersonally 
valid norms of decision. The emphasis is not so much on the criteria of the 
decision, but on the fact that the intention corresponds to a deliberate choice. 
Therefore, a choice is often based on subjective motives. This is a very weak 
sense of rationality, although an important preliminary one. 
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The second notion of rationality is linked to the ideal norm of consistency 
or transitivity of choices. The rationality does not stem from the contents of 
individual choices as such, but just from the fact that individuals are consist-
ent in the ordering of their subjective preferences. Preferences are clearly not 
considered to be rational in this case. It is the official position of neo-classical 
economics, where rationality does not involve any kind of “right” decision, 
but only the fact that people do not take inconsistent decisions (Sen, 1977). 
Irrationality here would correspond to inconsistent choices of the kind, again, 
described by Kahneman and Tversky (2000), or Elster (2010). Here again, 
the transitivity of choices implies that the contents of the choice are not part 
of the rational dimension, and therefore depend on other dimensions (either 
subjective, psychological or social). Preferences are considered to be outside 
the realm of rationality, sometimes characterized as irrational, and sometimes 
as “a-rational”. The criterion of rationality is here only consistency. Although 
limited in scope, it clearly has a normative aspect, which poses two questions: 
Why should consistency be assimilated to rationality, that is, why does ration-
ality involve consistency? Alternatively, is it conceivable for someone to have 
reasons not to be consistent in her preferences? This poses the problem of the 
reversal of preferences, and of the localization of consistency in time: should an 
apparently inconsistent choice be interpreted as irrational, or as an adaptation 
of choices given the possible evolution in time of given preferences? This is 
the position defended by Elster, who does not consider that reversal of prefer-
ences in time should be considered as irrational. It is a difficult topic: on the 
one hand, it is clear that in sociology the idea of stable preferences relatively 
independent of time change is useless, and should not be the default solution 
that would be highlighted only for modelling reasons. We have to take into 
account, in a realistic way, all the changes of preferences that can be observed, 
and there is moreover room for a rational interpretation of change of prefer-
ences. On the other hand, we cannot escape the issue of consistency of choices 
(for example in polls analysis), although successive choices always intervene in 
definite periods of time. 
The third notion of rationality links it to an instrumental dimension of 
action, where an actor chooses the adequate means to reach an end. The idea of 
rationality derives here from an ability to select the correct means to achieve an 
end, which requires that the normative notion of correctness is here implied, 
whereas in the previous notion of rationality, the normativity of rationality was 
located in consistency. It should be noted that, although instrumental rational-
ity is widely associated with standard economics, it can be separated from it 
from two opposed points of view: first, as was noted by Weber, instrumental 
action does not necessarily imply any kind of economic motives. Second, the 
transitivity of preferences, which is the core of neo-classical formalization of 
economic action, does not in fact involve a notion of instrumental action. 
Here again, instrumental rationality presupposes and involves motives that 
can be related to a social dimension. However, the criteria of rationality are 
clear and rather univocal. Although this notion of instrumental rationality has 
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been defined by western philosophy and sociology in specific contexts, and 
has its own scientific history, it can in retrospect be applied to many human 
conducts in the most diverse cultural settings. An important question in this 
respect is whether animal behaviour, which is often clearly instrumental, can 
be defined in terms of rationality on this basis (Turner and Maryanski, 2008). 
A more common challenge for such a theory of instrumental rationality is 
to interpret the behaviours that seemingly depart from its requirements: for 
instance magic rituals. 
The fourth notion of rationality is clearly the most widespread in today’s 
social sciences, although it suffers major ambiguities (Demeulenaere, 1996) 
and can be the subject of deep criticism. It is the idea that people act rationally 
whenever they efficiently pursue their self-interest (Coleman, 1990). This is a 
much different and narrower conception of rationality: it does not insist only 
on the deliberate choice of an end, nor on the means to achieve an end, nor 
on the consistency of the ends, but on the ends of action themselves, namely 
self-interest. 
In this scenario there is, however, a deep hesitation between two alterna-
tives (Demeulenaere, 2011): either the preferences are supposed to be the same 
for all the actors (like a typical preference for an increase in wealth), or they 
can be dissimilar (like smokers’ or non-smokers’ preferences). Consequently, 
it is not easy to interpret the notion of costs and benefits, since they can cor-
respond to the same choices for a set of actors, or, conversely, to opposed 
choices; for instance, in the case of smokers and non-smokers who clearly do 
not have the same appreciation of costs and benefits regarding smoking. On 
the one hand, it seems clear that people do often have the same sense of costs 
and benefits and that it is relevant to interpret their actions in terms of maxi-
mizing benefits and reducing costs on the common basis of shared conceptions 
of advantages and disadvantages. On the other hand, they often do not agree 
on what is a cost, and what is a benefit, and in this case any reference to costs 
and benefits has no specific contents and only designates different choices and 
different subjective (or socially prescribed) evaluations of a situation. Saying 
that people maximize their benefit tends to be tautological, since any choice 
is by definition an attempt to maximize satisfaction. This problem is a fun-
damental one and is unresolved by the standard rational choice model which 
tends to assert at the same time that preferences are diverse, and to reason in 
terms of implicitly or explicitly unified costs and benefits: the two contentions 
are not consistent. 
This theory is strongly normative since it reduces rationality to the choice 
of self-interest, that is, it considers that it is rational to select one’s interest 
instead of, for instance, to adhere to a value or a social norm (and values or 
social norms should be interpreted in terms of self-interest). However, it can 
be argued that the theory is not normative at all (Homans, 1987), since it is 
just a description of a typical behaviour and an attempt to model the fact that 
people tend to maximize their self-interest, without any evaluative appreciation 
of that attitude. The rational choice model would be just a matter of action 
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modelling, devoid of any action evaluation. This position can be defended with 
good arguments. It would have as a consequence that the notion of rational-
ity is here rather useless, and that its concept (with all its background) is not 
really part of the theory. The idea would only be that people typically tend to 
maximize their interest, without any consideration about the rationality of this 
conduct. The notion of rationality would be taken in a sense that is devoid 
of all its usual requirements. Therefore, it should be in fact better to avoid it 
because of its normative connotations. 
However, this is implausible. Although the rational choice model can be 
reduced to a self-interest maximization modelling of action, it does in fact 
involve specific rationality considerations for two different and unequally 
acceptable reasons. One of them is indeed very disputable. 
The first reason is the instrumental dimension that is involved in this 
characterization of action: people, when they pursue their self-interest, tend 
to select the appropriate means to reach their ends. This is the core idea that 
led Weber and Pareto to interpret economic actions in terms of rationality, 
and precisely in terms of instrumental rationality, whereas before them, for 
instance in Mill’s theorization of economic action, no explicit reference to 
rationality was made. This assimilation of economic action to instrumental 
rationality can be challenged in return on two bases: first, it can be noticed 
that most often there is no availability of definite means to reach economic 
ends; second, there is no reason to exclude the fact that in pursuing economic 
ends people can sometimes use non-rational or irrational methods (like, for 
instance, feng shui beliefs). The connection of economic motives to adequate 
instrumental choices is not an obvious one. It has a normative side, since it is 
considered that, having economic motives, people should select the adequate 
means to reach them. 
The second reason is more controversial: it has its roots in some type 
of positivist belief that asserts that it is rational for someone to pursue her 
interest. This derives from a negative proposition: belief in values cannot be 
rational, since they are not based on fact description. The positive proposi-
tion would be to assert that, by nature, people tend to pursue their interest 
(as opposed to cultural values) and this is why it is rational to adopt this 
conduct. Pareto was ambiguous about the interpretation of the status of 
interests: on the one side he maintained that any interest, as much as a value, 
does not belong to the logical side of action, since it cannot be based on the 
description of a fact. On the other hand, he suggests on several occasions 
that people who pursue their interests have so-called logical attitudes. At any 
rate, it has been since then commonly admitted that rationality involves the 
pursuit of interest, not just as an instrumental choice of the means to reach 
them, but also as the choice of interest itself as a rational end. For instance, 
in Parsons’ theorization of action, when he refers to values, he refers to “non-
rational” ends, as opposed to rational interests. Similarly, Elster (2009, 2010) 
refers to irrationality when people adopt attitudes that do not correspond 
to self-interest. 
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In sum, we have four different criteria for rationality:
— Intentionality, the idea of rationality being here that people have reasons 
to decide what they decide.
— Consistency, since it appears intuitively that people should not contradict 
themselves in formulating their choices.
— Adequacy of the choice of the means to reach an end, when a correct choice 
of means is in fact available, and since it would be ineffective to select the 
wrong means.
— The choice of interest, since it is a sound choice regarding human nature. 
Clearly, the fourth notion does not provide the same self-evidence as the 
three previous ones, as I have just pointed out. A fifth notion of rationality 
is much rarer in social sciences, as a consequence of the influence of positiv-
ism: it extends the scope of rationality to the determination of somehow 
right choices that include not only correct beliefs but also normative delib-
erations about ends. Boudon has advocated the reintroduction in sociology 
of this classical meaning of rationality in philosophy. I will outline now his 
conception. 
3. Boudon’s theory of rationality
Boudon’s main idea regarding the theory of rationality is that people have good 
reasons to do what they do, that is, not only reasons, but precisely good ones. 
Given their situation and given the information they have, they tend to do the 
somehow right choice that is available from their point of view. To introduce 
the notion of point of view is to consider that a good choice is often, in prin-
ciple, attainable. However, people do not necessarily make this ideally good 
choice, but the one they do is the best from the point of view of their situation 
and information. When the notion of right choice is introduced (through the 
notion of “good reasons” to make a given choice) this can involve at the same 
time truly right choices, per se (given our capacities to justify a choice), and 
sometimes erroneous choices, but the latter appear to be the best ones given 
the situation of the actor and her point of view. This theory is rather similar to 
Popper’s one, or Dray’s one (1964), but Boudon’s attempt was more explicitly 
intended to limit the scope of the predominant rational choice theory and to 
reintroduce a more specific treatment of the rationality of normative issues. 
It is different from Simon’s theory of bounded rationality in his emphasis on 
good reasons. 
Boudon’s theory of rationality is based on two main critiques of other con-
ceptions of rationality. One is addressed to the classical Humean theory. There 
is a debate about the exact significance of Hume’s contention about rationality 
I will not discuss here. I will just mention that Hume’s theorization is more 
complex and subtler than its caricature. Boudon develops his comments on 
the basis of two common interpretations of Hume’s legacy: 
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— The fact/value dichotomy 
— The restriction, given this dichotomy, of rationality to the choice of means, 
not to the choice of ends.
Hume’s legacy has been influential in the social sciences, especially in eco-
nomics, and it can be said to have partly led to the current rational choice 
model which associates an instrumental dimension regarding the choice of 
the means, and a so-called utilitarian one regarding the ends: people rationally 
pursue their self-interest. I have just indicated that those two dimensions are 
fundamentally different and that they should be separated in the conceptual-
ization of the issue of rationality. 
Boudon’s critique regarding this tradition and this model has three main 
aspects, one about beliefs, one about the instrumental dimension, and one about 
the choice of norms. Regarding beliefs, Boudon has three main contentions. 
First, he introduces the idea that a cognitive dimension (and rationality) is 
necessary to interpret positive beliefs (for instance about magic) that are shared 
by people in given situations. Although Boudon says that cognitive rationality 
does not belong to the Humean theorization of rationality, we can reply that 
this is not the case: Hume clearly asserts that reason can select correct beliefs; in 
particular the choice of means to reach an end presupposes such beliefs. Natu-
rally the word “cognitive” is a modern one, but the idea of a relevant positive 
belief based on an appropriate use of reason clearly belongs to Hume’s legacy. 
Regarding errors, Boudon has been critical of Kahneman’s and Tversky’s 
perspectives when they insist on the impact of biases in the formation of beliefs 
and decisions. Boudon criticizes their trend (although not an overwhelming 
one) to interpret such biases as causal ones, and consequently to character-
ize the behaviours that are dependent on such biases as irrational. Boudon 
has instead insisted on the reasons for which individuals endorse false beliefs, 
given their situation and information. He has pledged, following Weber, for a 
rationalistic interpretation of error instead of a causal and irrationalistic one. 
This is a major discussion for the philosophy of social sciences: the debate 
must clearly continue to go on; it is related to the link between psychology 
and the social sciences. 
The most important topic Boudon has insisted on is that beliefs are also 
implied in matters about norms. This means that normative beliefs are implied 
in the adoption of norms as well as positive beliefs. Both depend on reasons: 
reasoning about norms and values does exist in everyday life. This line of argu-
ment is a clear rupture with Hume’s or Pareto’s tradition. Boudon has tried 
to convince that this theory of reasoning about values was on the contrary 
defended by Weber or Durkheim (Boudon, 1998, 2000), despite the common 
thinking that they did not do so. This particular historical point will not be 
discussed here. The main idea here is that people have systems of reasons about 
the values and norms they endorse, as much as they have systems of reasons 
about the positive beliefs they endorse. Therefore, it is irrelevant to separate 
the positive and the normative aspects, since they are both unified by the exist-
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ence of beliefs and by the fact that those beliefs are supported by reasons peo-
ple have, in their situation, to accept them. For instance, people support the 
death penalty (normative position) because they believe it is efficient. They can 
renounce it when they find out that it is not in fact efficient (positive belief). 
Instrumental rationality appears in this perspective as only one aspect of 
having reasons to take a decision or to make a choice. Boudon, however, 
is critical of three dimensions commonly associated with the reduction of 
rationality to instrumental action. He does not so much insist, as Hume did, 
on the empirical evidence for the selection of the right means as a base for the 
idea of a rational selection. Instead, he describes instrumental action as the 
choice made by an actor of a definite action because of its consequences. In 
Weber’s definition of Zweckrationalität, both aspects are present, and even a 
third one: the right choice of the means (supported by empirical evidence), 
the anticipation of consequences, and the comparison of the ends given those 
predictable consequences. 
What Boudon has claimed is that people often behave not only on the basis 
of the consequences of their action (which he envisages as utilitarian ones), 
but on behalf of principles they endorse. Moreover, they do not behave only 
to fulfil their self-interest, but they obey to moral principles. 
Two examples in this case are central: first the paradox of voting, second 
the prisoner’s dilemma. Both have no solution on an instrumental rational-
ity principle. In a large poll, people should not vote on an instrumental basis 
because their vote makes no difference. But they do vote. People should not 
cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma situation, because their interest leads them 
not to cooperate. However, they do cooperate. This is why the notion of axi-
ological rationality is introduced. 
Boudon’s reference to axiological rationality is his most innovative contri-
bution. The main idea is that it is possible to reason about values and norms, 
and that values and norms problems can have good solutions. Boudon dis-
tances himself from the rational choice model that would treat the adoption of 
norms either as a part of given irrational preferences, or as the result of a calcu-
lation of self-interest. Since there are reasons that are given by actors for their 
choices of values, it cannot be said to be just the manifestation of an irrational 
trend. Since people often endorse principles that do not correspond to their 
self-interest, it cannot be said that they adopt values and norms only when they 
suit their interest. They do not stem either from natural unconscious trends.
On the other hand, Boudon rejects a culturalist perspective that would 
reduce the adoption of norms and values to a consequence of various social 
and cultural settings, without any intrinsic justification. The idea is again that 
people believe in the values they adopt and are often able to give reasons for 
their beliefs. This is why Boudon contrasts his interpretation of Weber’s axi-
ological rationality with the one which is commonly held: axiological ration-
ality does not just correspond to coherence with values, whatever their roots 
are; axiological rationality is instead a rational ability to reason about norms, 
and to adopt a behaviour that stems from this rational acceptance of norms. 
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For instance, people can understand that from a consequential point of view, 
they have no reason to vote in a large-scale poll, because one vote makes no 
difference. Despite this knowledge, they will vote because they understand, 
on the basis of rationality, that participation is important in order to respect 
the democratic principles they adhere to from the perspective of axiological 
rationality. 
What then are the criteria that allow us to determine, rationally, the valid-
ity of normative principles? Boudon has mostly developed his theory as a com-
ment on crucial examples. The good reasons are not unified in his presentation 
as a deductive body of propositions: they mostly arise from particular discus-
sions of particular issues, which are not grounded in a few general assumptions. 
Instead, every single case is envisioned from its own properties. 
However, it can be said that his reflection about the rationality of norms 
has led Boudon to stress three general principles. They clearly do not exhaust 
all the necessary elements that are present in reasoning about norms, but they 
constitute recurrent major ingredients (although very different in nature) of 
this reasoning. 
The first one is the principle of human dignity, often referred to as a 
substantial overall source of normative beliefs. It seems to Boudon that this 
principle does not have to be justified as such, it has a kind of self-obviousness. 
The second is the principle of impartiality theorized in Smith’s impartial 
spectator. People have a more appropriate sense of the correct normative atti-
tude when their own interest is not at stake. 
The third is an evolutionary stance Boudon has increasingly introduced 
in his reflection about norms: new principles tend to arise, and are selected 
because of their strength and intrinsic appeal; for instance, the principles of the 
separation of powers. Once they are defined and applied, it becomes extremely 
difficult to challenge them. This leads to a rather optimistic and evolutionary 
theory of norms where better norms, in the long run, tend first to appear and 
then to replace inadequate ones. Boudon has repeatedly, for instance, described 
the death penalty as a more and more inacceptable sanction: because it is inef-
ficient, because it is cruel, and because it makes any judicial error irreparable. 
Boudon thought that the death penalty would be progressively abolished, in 
particular in the United States of America. In his view, the theory of axiological 
rationality could allow us to make some specific predictions. 
4. Towards an integrated theory of rationality 
Boudon’s theory of good reasons has major theoretical advantages. It is an 
attempt to bridge values and facts, positive beliefs and normative beliefs. It is 
an effort to link sophisticated intellectual investigations and ordinary think-
ing about norms and values. It is therefore a combination of philosophical 
investigation and of sociological explanation. It puts together normative con-
siderations and empirical data. It relates correct beliefs and right norms to 
false beliefs and unjust practices in a common interpretation. It combines a 
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diversity of rationality aspects (cognitive, instrumental, utilitarian, axiological) 
in a unified perspective. It departs from a narrow naturalism that would not 
be sensitive to social variations and cultural diversity of norms, but it similarly 
rejects a simple culturalism that would not succeed in explaining the variation 
of norms on the basis of the change of situations and of the rational dimen-
sion of any belief. It integrates more diverse social particular situations to its 
framework than other theories of rationality. It leads us to abandon a naïve 
and intuitive sociological commentary on data by providing a more systematic 
guide to interpretation that takes into account the logic of formation of beliefs 
and decisions in various social situations and individual positions. In particular 
it gives all its strength to the idea that people do not hold beliefs or decide 
actions on the basis of only cultural or subjective grounds: their rationality is 
what allows us to interpret their formation. 
However, Boudon’s theory can be completed and enhanced in several 
dimensions. First, the advantage of the classical Humean criteria for ration-
ality is that they are clear and undisputable: it is experience, or empirical 
evidence, that provides the elements for a correct belief about a fact (namely 
facts about the proper means to reach an end). We do not have the correspond-
ing evidence to interpret as rational the choice of the various and opposing 
norms that govern social life. Boudon’s theory tends first to assert that some 
norms are better than others. Their advantage stems from particular reasoning, 
which refers to various principles. He then tries to demonstrate that the better 
norms tend to prevail and are widely shared by people. But he does not really 
display clear criteria to demonstrate that the choice of those norms is rational. 
The problem of the reference to good reasons is that in some sense everyone 
has good reasons to do what he does, but that does not necessarily provide a 
framework for a unified theory of behaviour. Boudon tries to reach this unified 
position, but it is not sure he always succeeds in doing that.
We should therefore reconsider the elements that can justify the idea of 
rationality. The strength of Boudon’s theory’s can be seen partly as a weak-
ness. The strength is the pluralistic, supple, and open dimension of rationality, 
sensitive to the variation of individual and social situations. The consequence 
of this, however, is the risk of having little difference between reasons (which 
depend on various subjective and cultural motives) and good reasons (truly 
rational), and therefore no clear criterion for discriminating right decisions 
among competing ones. 
To partly overcome this problem, I have suggested (Demeulenaere, 2003) 
that we should introduce a reflection that provides us with the general basis for 
defining something as rational. Something is said to be rational when it obeys 
a norm that drives the decision; a norm that is not subjective or cultural. For 
instance, following Weber (1978), to say that two plus two equals four corre-
sponds to a correct choice that is neither subjective nor cultural. It corresponds 
to a norm of correctness that “forces us “ to admit that two plus two equals 
four. If everything is subjective, or cultural, there is no room for the idea of 
rationality, and no idea of the correctness of this sort. Similarly, an adequate 
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belief regarding a fact is something, based on a norm of correctness (Putnam, 
2002), which should not be seen, if it is to be rational, as a subjective belief or 
a cultural attitude. We are complied by the facts, in one manner or another, to 
adopt beliefs that are congruent with them (even if errors are common). Here 
again, any correct belief is dependent on a norm of correctness, which is not 
subjective or cultural. Naturally, it is possible to introduce the notion of sub-
jective rationality the way Boudon (1989) has done. It allows us to interpret, 
the way Weber had previously conceived them, typical errors that are rational 
in the sense that given the information someone has, and given the norms of 
rationality, she could not achieve the exact correct solution to a problem. The 
one reached was, however, the best option in her situation. It has a subjective 
dimension, although based on non-subjective norms. 
But how should we characterize these norms and where do they come 
from? What is the common element between intentionality, consistency of 
choices, choice of adequate means, and axiological rationality that entitle us to 
speak of rationality? I will not develop all this in this paper, but I will suggest 
two elements of reflection I have developed elsewhere (Demeulenaere, 2003):
- Rational norms derive from intrinsic features of action and reflection. 
Thinking and acting have their own norms. Consistency of choices, for 
instance, derives from the very notion of making a choice, or of ordering 
preferences. The idea of rationality derives from the features of action. Simi-
larly, when we describe a fact, the very notion of description implies that the 
description should be correct, and therefore poses its conditions for correctness. 
- Because of these intrinsic features of action and reflection, which are con-
stitutive of human behaviour, rationality norms are not subjective nor cultural, 
although they can be variously defined and more or less enhanced in various 
social contexts. The scope of the idea of rationality is to define interpersonally 
valid norms that are not reducible to cultural various settings. Their existence 
allows us to interpret particular behaviours that are inevitably concerned by 
these norms. 
- On the basis of those rationality norms, particular social norms, although 
normative, can correspond to rational solutions to problems. For instance, I 
cannot convince someone to accept a norm that is not in her interest, just by 
saying that it is in my own interest. It typically does not work from the point of 
view of the meaning of the process of justification of a social norm. The other 
person has to find an interest in the norm, or to find a more general reason to 
accept it, which cannot be only my own interest. This typically will not work 
(except if the person has a particular interest of her own in my interest). This 
is a point that had been made by Durkheim and Pareto. Therefore any social 
norm that is intended to be legitimate must inevitably take into account this 
constraint on any process of justification. So, any attempt to find legitimate 
social norms is constrained by this feature of any process of legitimization. The 
solution to this problem evolves given other social parameters. The rational 
choice is here to find solutions to this problem that are consistent with the 
general features of the process of legitimization. 
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Once they are conceived in particular social settings, the mechanisms by 
which these norms are diffused should be described more precisely. Boudon 
was inclined to put the emphasis on the correspondence between correct 
norms, or better norms (in his view) and a wide acceptance of those norms. 
Situations where unjust norms are widely accepted or where just norms are 
not diffused do naturally exist. For sure, he has many elements in his theory 
to explain such situations. But he did not really pay attention to the diffusion 
mechanisms that lead from one situation to another. 
Neither has Boudon specifically considered the influence of social groups 
on the formation of individual beliefs. People do not form their beliefs alone: 
when, for instance, they believe that there are massive destruction weapons in 
Iraq, they believe such a thing because they are part of a group where dissent 
is difficult and where everyone’s certitude is reinforced by that of the others. 
This is not incompatible with a theory of rational behaviour, but reasons are 
shared, and the fact that they are has a major influence on the formation of a 
singular belief. It is particularly true through educational processes. 
Finally, the role of emotions in the formation of beliefs, that is, the 
fact that beliefs are sensitive to desire (Elster, 2000, 2010), should be more 
precisely described. For sure, this does not mean that there are no rational 
beliefs. When someone adopts a belief she generally has more than just a 
desire to accept it; there must be some cognitive elements that give credit to 
the belief. But it is important to note that rationality by itself is supported 
by emotions (Damasio, 1999), and that other emotions tend to interfere 
with its verdicts. 
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